The article examines the record of compliance with the UN Committee against Torture’s decisions in individual complaints cases. Theoretically, I expect that compliance will be the outcome of a combination of normative and rationalist factors: States committed to human rights protection will comply even in the absence of enforcement but only as long as compliance costs remain relatively low. Using a data set covering all adverse decisions issued until 2018 and information on their compliance status, I employ fuzzy-set qualitative comparative (...) analysis to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcomes of compliance and noncompliance. The analysis reveals that the conditions tested—liberal democracy, nonuse of political terror, violation type, and strong civil society—are in part individually (near-)necessary and jointly sufficient for compliance, while the presence of their complements is consistent with noncompliance. The Committee against Torture thus appears to be able to elicit (some) state compliance with its decisions, if mostly only with respect to certain kinds of states and select types of violations. (shrink)